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LET HIM DIE WITH DIGNITY OR HOPE FOR
A CURE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERN
MEDICINE'
Andrew P. Lannon*
I. A SHARK AT[ACK AND A FAMILY LEFT WITH LITTLE
HOPE AND FEW CHOICES
On July 6, 2001, a 200 pound bull shark bit and nearly killed eight-year
old Jessie Arbogast at the Gulf Islands National Seashore in Pensacola,
Florida.2 Jessie was rushed to Baptist Hospital and was later transferred to
Sacred Heart Children's Hospital in critical, yet stable, condition.3 He lost
a significant amount of blood after the shark's firm bite entirely severed
his right arm.' He arrived at the hospital without a pulse or blood
pressure.' Due to the trauma, doctors were uncertain as to what would
happen should he regain consciousness. Would his brain continue to
function at a healthy level for a child his age, or would it be so irreparably
1.
Not long ago the realms of life and death were delineated by a bright line.
Now this line is blurred by wondrous advances in medical technology --
advances that until recent years were only ideas conceivable by such
science-fiction visionaries as Jules Verne and H.G. Wells. Medical
technology has effectively created a twilight zone of suspended animation
where death commences while life, in some form, continues. Some
patients, however, want no part of a life sustained only by medical
technology. Instead, they prefer a plan of medical treatment that allows
nature to take its course and permits them to die with dignity. As more
individuals assert their right to refuse medical treatment, more frequently
do the disciplines of medicine, law, philosophy, technology and religion
collide. This interdisciplinary interplay raises many questions to which no
single person or profession has all the answers.
Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 678 (Ariz. 1987).
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
I would like to thank my wife, Cora, my friends and my family for their help and
support over the countless hours I have spent researching and writing on this issue.
2. Nation in Brief, WASH. POST, July 16, 2001, at A16.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Brain Damage Feared in Mississippi Boy Attacked by Shark, WASH. POST,
July 10, 2001, at A22.
6. Nation in Brief, supra note 2, at A16.
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damaged by the massive blood loss that whatever sapient functions it used
to perform would be completely destroyed?
7
This dilemma left the Arbogast family with many unanswered
questions. What if Jessie's brain is so severely damaged that he may never
return to the child he once was? What if modern life-sustaining medical
procedures could keep Jessie alive for another sixty-five years? How
much will this medical treatment cost and who will pay the bills?8 Would
his family want to see him lie in bed or in a wheelchair: (1) unable to feed
himself, living on the nourishment provided through a nasogastric tube9
that has been painfully '° inserted through his nose; (2) unable to breath on
his own, requiring the assistance of an MA-1 respirator;" or (3) unable to
remove the mucus in his throat, needing an endotracheal tube 12 to prevent
him from drowning in his own bodily fluids? Would they wish to visit his
crippled body covered in bed sores, 3 atrophying at such an incredible rate
that he will weigh only sixty-five to seventy pounds when he reaches
adulthood," requiring constant care from a team of nurses in order to feed,
7. Brain Damage, supra note 5, at A22.
8. See John B. Oldershaw, Jeff Atkinson, and Louis D. Boshes, Persistent
Vegetative State: Medical, Ethical, Religious, Economic, and Legal Perspectives, 1
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 495, 515-16 (1997). Oldershaw went on to say:
In another study, twenty-three patients in PVS were reviewed, all
requiring at least one type of mechanical assistance such as respirators,
nasogastric or gastrostomy tubes, or intravenous lines. Each case was
complicated by incontinence and, in a majority or [sic] cases, by decubitus
ulcers, pneumonia, and urinary tract infections. The bills for thirteen
patients averaged $170,000, and the length of stay for all patients averaged
almost two-hundred days with the total number of "bed days" averaging
twelve and a half bed years. Survival of patients in PVS may extend for
many years depending heavily upon the level of supportive care. A
Hastings Center report in 1998 estimated the annual cost for PVS patients
as high as $1 billion.
Id.
9. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1216 (N.J. 1985) (defining a 'nasogastric
tube' as a feeding tube that is inserted through the nose and runs from the
esophagus to the stomach where it delivers nutrients to the patient).
10. Id.
11. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 655 (N.J. 1976) ("an MA-1 respirator, a
sophisticated machine which delivers a given volume of air at a certain rate and
periodically provides a 'sigh' volume, a relatively large measured volume of air
designed to purge the lungs of excretions").
12. See Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 582 (D.R.I. 1988).
13. See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1217.
14. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (1986).
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wash, clean, turn and help him with elimination of urine and fecal
matter?'5 Would they wish to visit him periodically, lie down on the bed
with his meager frame and wonder what he might have accomplished in
his life had that horrible, man-eating creature decided not to swim near
the Gulf shore on that fateful afternoon?
All of these daunting questions loom over any family presented with
such a crisis. Sadly, although modern medicine is now "capable of
sustaining life well past the point where natural forces would have brought
certain death in earlier times, ''6 a cure has yet to be found for the damage
15. Id.
16. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990). This
language also treads into the area of debate between actively hastening death, such
as through euthanasia, and passively causing death, such as by removing the
patient's respirator or nasogastric tubes. Cf. DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698,
707 (Ky. 1993). The court elaborated:
'Mercy killing' and 'euthanasia' or any other 'affirmative or deliberate act
to end life' are fundamental violations of the common law. The
key phrase is the last phrase, 'other than to permit the natural process of
dying,' and this phrase explains, clarifies and limits what is meant by an
'affirmative or deliberate act to end life.' This phrase recognizes that the
advances of medical technology have made it possible to sustain existence
when life has ended except for the 'natural process of dying.' This is not
an objective inquiry into the quality of life, but a subjective inquiry into
whether the patient wishes the continuation of medical procedures to
interdict 'the natural process of dying.' The withdrawal of nutrition and
hydration from a person in Sue DeGrella's state, irreversible brain
damage and a prolonged period in a persistent vegetative state, is
medically recognized as fitting the definition of 'permitting the natural
process of dying' as documented by the evidence in the record before us.
Id.
Cf. Christine H. Nooning, Surrogate Health Care Decision Making: The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Recognizes the Right of an Individual in a Permanent
Vegetative State to Refitse Life-Sustaining Measures Through a Surrogate Decision
Maker, 35 DUQ. L.REV. 849, 859 (1997) (citing Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1224).
Nooning commented further:
Other courts have distinguished the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment from the act of suicide by reasoning that patients who exercise
their right to refuse life-sustaining treatment do not actually intend to die
as does one who attempts suicide. The New Jersey Supreme Court
reasoned that 'people who refuse life-sustaining medical treatment may
not harbor a specific intent to die.. .rather, they may fervently wish to live,
but to do so free of unwanted medical technology, surgery or drugs, and
without protracted suffering.' Thus, the difference between the right to
2002]
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that results from anoxia, a prolonged lack of oxygen in the bloodstream
that causes irreversible damage in patients like Jessie. 7 To compound the
difficulty of these circumstances, adult patients who find themselves
placed in a crisis similar to Jessie's are unlikely to have executed a living
will or designated any agent to make crucial healthcare decisions.' Who
would plan for such tragedies? 9
refuse medical treatment and suicide is that the first involves self-
determination, whereas the latter involves self-destruction.
Id.
See also Roger S. Magnusson, The Sanctity of Life and the Right to Die: Social and
Jurisprudential Aspects of the Euthanasia Debate in Australia and the United States,
6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y 1, 5 (1997). Magnusson stated:
In view of the changing legal and moral foundations of society, it is
inevitable - whether in the short or medium term - that courts and
legislatures in western democracies will progressively legalize PAS
[physician-assisted suicide]/AVE [active voluntary euthanasia]. Within a
generation, the suggestion that a terminally ill patient should be denied
the right to die with medical assistance will appear primitive, if not
absurd.. .In the United States and beyond, the development of a legal
right to die with medical assistance, appears inevitable.
Id.
17. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 655.
18. In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 67-68 (Wis. 1992) ("Relatively few individuals
provide explicit written or oral instructions concerning their treatment preferences
should they become incompetent. The reasons for this are undoubtedly myriad:
ignorance, superstition, carelessness, sloth, procrastination or the simple refusal to
believe it could happen to oneself."); See also Barber v. Superior Court, 195
Cal.Rptr. 484, 489 (1983) ("The lack of generalized public awareness of the
statutory scheme and the typically human characteristics of procrastination and
reluctance to contemplate the need for such arrangements however makes this
[living will] a tool which all too often go unused by those who might desire it."); It
is important to note that just because Jessie is a minor that does not mean he is not
entitled to make his own medical decisions. Cf In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1205
(Me. 1990) ("It is well recognized that in all facets of life, 'a minor acquires
capacity to consent to different kinds of invasions and conduct at different stages
of his development. Capacity exists when the minor has the ability of the average
person to understand and weigh the risks and benefits."') (quoting Prosser and
Keaton on Torts, § 18 at 115 (5th ed. 1984)).
19. Neal F. Splaine, The Incompetent Individual's Right to Refuse Life-
Sustaining Medical Treatment: Legislating, Not Litigating, A Profoundly Private
Decision, 27 SUFFOLK U. L.REv. 905 (1993) ("Very few people are willing to
anticipate the possibility of incompetence and to make provisions for abating life-
sustaining medical care in such an event. Yet once an individual becomes
incompetent, the opportunity to execute advance directives has passed.").
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Jessie's family is now forced to make a heart-wrenching decision.
20Should they order the hospital to remove all life-sustaining equipment, or
should they hold out hope for a cure? They will understandably look for
guidance from family members, friends, doctors, lawyers and members of
their local parish 2' for answers to this ethical, moral, social, legal, medical
and spiritual dilemma.22 However, there is no answer that will lift the
burden from their shoulders, as the decision is theirs and theirs alone.
20. "Ceasing the nutrition and hydration will cause no pain, although, likewise,
continuing treatment causes no pain." Degrella, 858 S.W.2d at 702.
21. See Oldershaw, supra note 8, at 509-13. Oldershaw continued:
In fact, Catholic moral theology mandates a duty to reject burdensome
medical treatment and proclaims individuals must take responsibility for
the manner of their dying.. .Judaism forbids the hastening of death but
allows removing impediments to death... Islam believes that illness is a
result of God's or Allah's trial of the people. Physical illness may be
cured by recitation of the Koran or prayers. Under Islamic belief, Allah is
the creator of life, and no individual 'owns' his or her life. Therefore, no
person can actively terminate such life. Lutherans accept medical
judgment on the best course of action. They focus on the reality of the
situation while affirming the resurrection of the body in immortality after
death. Pentecostal religions invoke the New Testament gifts of healing.
Believers turn to healing through prayer and maintain a belief in miracles.
Therefore, Pentecostal believers generally will not terminate the PVS.
Afro-Caribbean religions, including some religious groups involving
Haitians, Cubans, Jamaicans, Puerto Ricans and African Americans,
consider healing as the work of religion... In these religions, physicians
play a lesser role in healing and decision-making. Indigenous groups in
Mexico believe in traditional curing practices performed by a healer, or
'Curandero.'...The traditional Irish view reveals that life is full of
suffering, and it must be accepted with stoic resignation. If the person is
to recover, then he shall independent of any efforts that are made.
Id.
22. See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1221 ("...raises moral, social, technological,
philosophical, and legal questions involving the interplay of many disciplines. No
one person or profession has all the answers."); Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 659 ("The
right to a natural death is one outstanding area in which the disciplines of theology,
medicine and law overlap; or, to put it another way, it is an area in which these
three disciplines convene."); and Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 378 (Cal.
1993). The court in Thor stated:
Although seemingly categorical, these pronouncements predate the
recent rapid advancements in medical technology with their attendant
ethical, moral and social implications. Illnesses and injuries that once
brought the clergy to the bedside of the afflicted now may bring a team of
20021
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Or is it? What if a family chooses to remove the life-sustaining
equipment from their child, and someone who opposes their decision
seeks court intervention? What should the court in their local
jurisdiction do?23  Should a court honor their wishes or refute their
decision?2 What tests will the court apply? Could the family be forced to
live the rest of their lives knowing that their relative is lying in a hospital
ward without any hope of a return to cognitive existence? Are they
expected to move on with their lives and forget? How could they possibly
do so?
This Comment will explore all of these questions and provide some
surprising answers. First, it will discuss the judicial history and the
competing social policies surrounding this issue since the 1976 decision of
In re Quinlan' to the most recent holding in Conservatorship of
Wendland.26 Second, it will present the often adversarial interests of the
state and family in the life-sustaining treatment of the patient. Third, this
Comment will analyze the beneficial and detrimental aspects of the
various tests and standards that have been supplied by the courts,
academics and various litigants throughout the past several decades.
Lastly, it will conclude with a proposed five-part model test, compiled
from the strongest aspects of tests already applied by courts.
highly skilled medical personnel fully equipped with sophisticated, life-
preserving machinery. Increasingly, the courts are drawn into the wake of
this technological process to mediate among the myriad concerns it has
generated.
Id.
23. See DeGrella, 858 S.W.2d at 705. The court said:
Indeed, every state that has considered the matter has upheld the right of
patients in a persistent vegetative state, through surrogates, to elect to
withdraw such medical care: some courts based their decision on common
law rights and some on common law viewed as constitutionally protected.
These seventeen states are Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island and Washington.
Id.
24. Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 691 ("The consequences of a decision to terminate
medical treatment will often be irreversible. Therefore, the court in any dispute
will assume that the patient wishes to continue receiving medical treatment, and
the burden to prove otherwise will rest on the party or parties desiring to
terminate the treatment.").
25. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647.
26. Conservatorship of Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001).
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II. FROM QUINLAN TO WENDLAND: DEVELOPMENT OF THE
JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF WHEN THE STATE'S PARENS PATRIAE
INTEREST IS OUTWEIGHED BY THE PATIENT'S INTEREST IN REFUSING
MEDICALTREATMENT
On the evening of April 15th, 1975, Karen Quinlan's respiratory
functions completely ceased for two fifteen-minute periods. Her
temperature rose to 100 degrees, 2 her pupils dilated and she became
unresponsive. 29 After she was rushed to the hospital and a series of
neurological tests were performed, her physician, Dr. Morse, concluded
that she was suffering from anoxia and that her brain had been severely
impaired.3" He determined she was in a coma" - a complete lack of
consciousness.32
Dr. Morse and other physicians at the hospital eventually determined
that Karen was in a chronic "persistent vegetative state" (or PVS) 3




31. But see Oldershaw, supra note 8, at 501. Oldershaw elaborated: -
Therefore, the difference between coma and PVS is that coma is a closed-
eye state of unresponsiveness, whereas PVS is an open-eyed condition
with no evidence of conscious awareness. A recent study found that
approximately 37 percent of patients after more than one month post
injury were diagnosed with coma or PVS inaccurately. The errors in
diagnosis were believed to be the result of confusion in terminology, lack
of extended observation of patients and lack of skill or training in the
assessment of neurologically devastated patients.
Id.
32. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 654. The court commented:
... there are basically two types of coma, sleep-like unresponsiveness and
awake unresponsiveness. Karen was originally in a sleep-like
unresponsive condition but soon developed "sleep-wake" cycles,
apparently a normal improvement for comatose patients occurring within
three to four weeks. In the awake cycle she blinks, cries out and does
things of that sort but is still totally unaware of anyone or anything around
her.
Id.
33. Id. at 654 ("a subject who remains with the capacity to maintain the
vegetative parts of neurological function but who no longer has any cognitive
function."). See In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (N.J. 1987). The court stated:
2002]
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Though not technically "brain dead,"' ' her prognosis was bleak since the
sapient function of her brain had been completely destroyed.35 Essentially,
the brain functions in two ways:
A body which is functioning entirely in terms of its internal controls. It
maintains temperature. It maintains heart beat and pulmonary
ventilation. It maintains digestive activity. It maintains reflexive activity
of muscles and nerves for low level conditioned responses. But there is no
behavioral evidence of either self-awareness or awareness of the
surroundings in a learned manner.
Id.
See also Romeo, 697 F.Supp. at 582. The court stated:
PVS is a type of comatose state in which the cerebral functioning has
ceased but in which the brain stem functioning is fully or partially intact.
The brain stem controls primitive reflexes, including heart activity,
breathing, the sleep/wake cycle, reflexive activity in upper and lower
extremities, some swallowing motions and eye movements.
Id.
Cf. Oldershaw, supra note 8, at 497-99. Oldershaw further commented:
Both the American Academy of Neurology and the American Medical
Association define patients in a persistent vegetative state as being
chronically awake, or suffering diurnal sleep-wake cycles, but without
consciousness of their surroundings.. .Because the cerebral cortex is not
functioning, PVS patients essentially have 'amentia,' a lack of language
function. It is believed patients in a persistent vegetative state do not
experience pain and suffering, because both emotions are conscious
attributes requiring an intact cerebrum.. Depending on the etiology of the
PVS, most patients are in a vegetative state for one month or more and do
not recover to a level of independent function. The American Academy
of Neurology recommends a waiting period of three months to establish
the PVS diagnosis.
Id.
34. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 654. See also D. Walton, ETHICS OF WITHDRAWAL OF
LIFE-SUPPORT SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES ON DECISION MAKING IN INTENSIVE CARE
97 (1983) ("whole-brain death results in such irreversible fluctuations and
disorganization of the human organism that irreversible destruction of the whole
body by irreversible cardiac arrest will follow within a short period" - probably no
more than a week); Id. at 76-80 (A person suffering from an irreversible coma as a
result of partial brain death is not considered dead since he still has some brain
functioning); and Oldershaw, supra note 8, at 499 ("The presently accepted
standard definition of whole or global brain death, under the Uniform
Determination of Death Act, specifies that an individual can be determined to be
dead if the person has sustained irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire
brain including the brain stem.").
35. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 655.
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We have an internal vegetative regulation which controls body
temperature which controls breathing, which controls to a
considerable degree blood pressure, which controls to some
degree heart rate, which controls chewing, swallowing and which
controls sleeping and walking. We have a more highly
developed brain which is uniquely human which controls our
relation to the outside world, our capacity to talk, to see, to feel,
to sing, to think. Brain death necessarily must mean the death of
both of these functions of the brain, vegetative and the sapient.
Therefore, the presence of any function which is regulated or
governed or controlled by the deeper parts of the brain which in
laymen's terms might be considered purely vegetative would
mean that the brain is not biologically dead.36
Immediately after this tragic, unexplainable sequence of events, Karen
was placed on a respirator, and a nasogastric tube was inserted through
her nose and into her stomach to provide nutrition.37 No treatment or
procedure was known or available to treat her condition. The medical
staff predicted that her brain would never regain its cognitive existence. 9
Seemingly left with no other choice, Karen's father and appointed
guardian,' Joseph Quinlan, sought to remove the life-sustaining medical
equipment and let his daughter die with dignity.41 However, Dr. Morse
refused, contending that his understanding of medical standards, practice
and ethics prevented him from doing so.
The case reached the New Jersey Supreme Court, which held that relief
could be granted to Joseph Quinlan only if several conditions were
satisfied.43 First, the physicians attending to Karen had to conclude that
there was no reasonable possibility of her ever returning to a cognitive
state." If the attending physicians so concluded, then all members of
Karen's family had to unanimously consent to withdraw the life-sustaining
medical equipment. If unanimous consent was attained, both the
attending physician and Karen's family had to meet with a hospital "Ethics
36. Id. at 654.
37. Id. at 655.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 651.
41. Id. at 656.
42. Id.
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Committee" or a similar consultative body." If that consultative body
were to agree with both the doctors and the family, then life-sustaining
medical procedures could be withdrawn, and Karen would be allowed to
die with dignity from the underlying natural causes of her condition. 7
Furthermore, the New Jersey Supreme Court eased Dr. Morse's fears by
providing that if this process were adhered to, no person involved could be
held civilly or criminally liable. 8
Since Quinlan, 9 a number of courts have addressed this issue. The most
prominent case was Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health" in which
the parents of a woman who suffered irreparable brain damage from an
automobile accident sought to remove all life-sustaining medical
equipment." The Supreme Court acknowledged that there is both a
common law right52 and a constitutional right53 to refuse medical
treatment54 which dates back to Union Pacific Railroad Company v.
Botsford.55 The Botsford court stated, "no right is held more sacred, or is
more carefully guaranteed, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable




49. "The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Quinlan, was the first appellate court
to uphold a patient's refusal of medical care based on the federal constitutional
right of privacy. Since Quinlan, many jurisdictions have followed this
constitutional analysis. Other courts, however, continue to rely solely upon the
common-law right of self-determination to uphold a patient's right to refuse
treatment." Splaine, supra note 19, at 910.
50. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
51. Id. at 261, 266.
52. Id. at 277.
53. Id. at 278.
54. Splaine, supra note 19, at 911. The court stated:
A patient's right to refuse unwanted medical care, whether it derives from
common law or the Constitution, is not absolute. Courts must balance the
patient's right to refuse medical treatment against several state interests
such as preserving life, protecting innocent third parties' interests,
preventing suicide and maintaining the medical profession's ethical
integrity."
Id.
55. 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
56. Id. at 251.
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further expanded in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital.57
Justice Benjamin Cardozo stated, "Every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body;
and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages."5 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has emphasized that this right of refusal, a corollary to the
patient's right of informed consent before any medical treatment,59 must
necessarily be balanced against the State's firmly rooted parens patriae 6
interest in preserving life.6 The Supreme Court avows that the State need
not remain a bystander when the family of an incompetent ward decided
to take her life. 2 On the contrary, the Supreme Court asserted that the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution63 explicitly directed Missouri to
intervene.' The Supreme Court explained the reasons for this protection:
"Not all incompetent patients will have loved ones available to serve as
surrogate decision-makers. And even where family members are present,
[t]here will, of course, be some unfortunate situations in which family
members will not act to protect a patient., 65 A state is entitled to guard
against potential abuses in such situations. 66
Analyzing the factual background surrounding Ms. Cruzan, the
Supreme Court determined that the Cruzan family had failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Cruzan would have wanted to
withdraw life-sustaining treatment in her condition. 67  Though the
57. 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), rev'd on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 143
N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
58. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93.
59. See Splaine, supra note 20, at 909.
60. See L.W., 482 N.W.2d at 76 n.9. The court declared:
Parens patriae literally means 'parent of the country' and refers to the
role of the state as guardian of persons under legal disabilities, such as
juveniles or incompetent persons. Under the theory of parens patriae it is
the right and duty of the state to step in and act in what appears to be the
best interests of the ward.
Id.
61. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280-82.
62. Id. at 280-81.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
64. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
65. Id. at 281-82 (quoting Jobes, 529 A.2d at 447).
66. Id. at 281.
67. Id. at 280.
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Supreme Court conceded that there was evidence presented in the
Missouri trial court that Ms. Cruzan had made statements to her
housemate approximately one year before her accident that she would not
wish to live as a vegetable, the Court stated that these statements had
failed to satisfy the Court's high evidentiary burden since the statements
did not deal directly with the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.
6
1
The Court emphasized that the clear and convincing evidence standard
was appropriate because of the important state interest presented, namely
the protection and preservation of human life.69
Since Cruzan, most states have conformed their own tests and
evidentiary standards to substantially replicate the Supreme Court's
holding, yet with significant differences.0 The most recent decision on the
matter has come from the Supreme Court of California in Conservatorship
of Wendland." Wendland is strikingly similar to Cruzan in that the source
of the patient's suffering was a tragic car accident.72  Significantly, the
conservatee, Robert Wendland, was never in a comatose state, unlike
Cruzan and Quinlan. Rather he was conscious, yet severely disabled both
mentally and physically, unable to feed or care for himself. 73 He was able
to interact with his environment, albeit inconsistently. 4 At his highest
level of function after the accident, he was able to perform very menial
68. Id. at 285.
69. Id. at 280.
70. See, e.g., Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209; Lillian F. v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. Rptr.
603(1984); Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484; Wendland, 28 P.3d 151; In re Edna M.F.,
563 N.W.2d 485 (1997); Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760 (Cal. 1985);
Conservatorship of Morrison, 253 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1988); L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60;
Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); Thor, 855 P.2d 375; Bartling v. Superior
Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr 297; Conservatorship of
Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1988); In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995);
Rasmussen, 741 P.2d 674; Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482 A.2d 713
(Conn. 1984); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980);
John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921 (Fla. 1984); In re L.H.R., 321
S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1984); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); Brophy v. New
England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986); Conservatorship of
Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); Jobes, 529 A.2d 447; Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647;
In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981); Leach v. Akron General Med. Ctr., 426
N.E.2d 809 (Ohio 1980); In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445 (Wash. 1987);
and In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983).
71. 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001).
72. Wendland, 28 P.3d at 154.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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tasks. ". Despite small improvements in his condition due to intensive
therapy, his disabilities were severe. Once it became apparent that
Robert's cognitive abilities would never return to their pre-accident status,
Robert's wife, children, brother, the hospital's physicians and even the
hospital's ombudsman collectively decided to end life-sustaining
procedures.76 Nevertheless, Robert's mother and sister objected. They
petitioned the California judiciary to prevent the cessation of life-
sustaining treatment, as well as to remove Rose Wendland, Robert's wife,
as Robert's "conservator.""
Though the factual situation would seem to strongly favor California's
parens patriae interest over Rose's decision to refuse life-sustaining
treatment, the California Supreme Court refused to apply a higher
standard than the clear and convincing standard set forth in Cruzan. The
Court was satisfied with that standard, indicating that it was a sufficient
evidentiary burden to protect important rights.' The "'clear and
convincing evidence' test requires a finding of high probability, based on
evidence 'so clear as to leave no substantial doubt' [and] 'sufficiently
strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind."'7 9
Before the accident, Robert had twice expressed his wishes to refuse
life-sustaining treatment.' The first such incident occurred when Rose
decided to turn off the respirator that was sustaining the life of her father.8"
75. Id. at 154-55 (reporting activities such as throwing a ball, operating an
electric wheelchair with assistance, turning pages, drawing circles, drawing an 'R'
and performing two-step commands. For example, he was able to respond
appropriately to the command 'close your eyes and open them when I say the
number 3'. He could choose a requested color block out of a four color blocks,
etc.).
76. Id.
77. Id. A conservator is "a person appointed by the court to manage the estate
or affairs of another who is incapable of doing so." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 127
(Pocket ed. 1996).
78. Wendland, 28 P.3d at 168. See e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982) (applying the clear and convincing standard of proof in proceedings
involving the termination of parental rights); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979) (applying the clear and convincing standard in deciding whether to commit
a person to a mental hospital); and Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (applying the clear and convincing standard in deciding
whether to deport an immigrant).
79. Wendland, 28 P.3d at 173.
80. Id. at 157.
81. Id.
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Robert stated, "I would never want to live like that, and I wouldn't want
my children to see me like that and look at the hurt you're going through
as an adult seeing your father like that."'
The second occasion occurred shortly after the death of Rose's father
when Robert developed a serious drinking problem.83 Robert's brother,
Michael, stopped by to admonish Robert for consuming too much alcohol
stating, "I'm going to get a call from Rosie one day, and you're going to be
in a terrible accident."' To which Robert replied, "If that ever happened
to me, you know what my feelings are. Don't let that happen to me. Just
let me go. Leave me alone."85 Even Robert's daughter, Kate, recalled him
saying during his conversation with Michael that "if he could not be a
provider for his family, if he could not do all the things that he enjoyed
doing, just enjoying the outdoors, just basic things, feeding himself,
talking, communicating, if he could not do those things, he would not want
to live." 6
Though the California Supreme Court acknowledged that statements
from a conservatee prior to an accident would be a necessary guide for the
conservator in deciding whether the conservatee would exercise his right
to forego life-sustaining medical procedures, 7 the Court was not satisfied
that Robert's statements to his family satisfied the clear and convincing
standard of proof.' The Court reasoned that Robert was not thinking
clearly in either instance.8" In the first instance, Robert was grief-stricken
and angry at the loss of his father-in-law, and in the second instance
Robert was intoxicated. 90 Furthermore, none of these statements was an
"'exact on all-fours' description" of his current medical condition.9' As a
result, his statements were given little credibility. 92
In its conclusion, the California Supreme Court held that Rose's
position was supported by nothing more than a subjective viewpoint that
82. Id.




87. Id. at 168 ("The only apparent purpose of requiring conservators to make
decisions in accordance with the conservatee's wishes, when those wishes are
known, is to enforce the fundamental principle of personal autonomy.").
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Robert should be removed from life-sustaining treatment.93 As a result,
the Court held that California's parens patriae interest significantly
outweighed any competing interest, and ordered that Robert remain on
life support.
As the Wendland court noted, to the extent it and its predecessor in
interest, Conservatorship of Drabick,9" had relied on the rights of an
incompetent conservatee to justify the decision of the competent
conservator to end the conservatee's life, the federal courts have
absolutely refused to adopt this position.6 Nevertheless, state courts have
not hesitated, and in fact have gone even further, by developing various
tests and criteria to determine when, and under what conditions, a
conservator may end all medical procedures used to prolong a
conservatee's life. These various tests, and their strengths and
weaknesses, are discussed in the following section.
III. SIFTING THROUGH THE STANDARDS OF PROOF AND APPLIED
TESTS
A. Standards of Proof
In confronting any controversy where competing interests are asserted,
the judiciary's task is to determine the appropriate standard of proof,
keeping in mind the nature and purpose of the proceeding, any possible
intrusion or stigma involved and any potential deprivation of liberty.97
Furthermore, it is designed to allocate the risks of error between the
93. Id. at 174.
94. Id. The issue was moot by the time of the decision because Robert passed
away prior to the California Supreme Court's hearing of this case. Nevertheless,
the issue was adjudged to be so important that the Court chose to hear the case
anyway.
95. 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1988).
96. Wendland, 28 P.3d at 162.
97. Lillian F., 206 Cal. Rptr. at 606. See also Addington, 441 U.S. at 423
(quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). J.
Harlan went on to say:
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the
Due Process Clause and in the realm of fact-finding, is to 'instruct the
fact-finder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks should
have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of
adjudication.
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litigants and to demonstrate the relative importance attributed to the
ultimate decision. 98
Generally speaking, there are three standards of proof: preponderance
of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.99  At the least stringent end of the spectrum is
preponderance of the evidence.' °° Since the outcome of many civil actions
will have little impact on anyone other than the parties involved, this
burden of proof falls squarely on the plaintiff, and any risk of error is
shared equally by the parties."0 ' The preponderance of the evidence
standard merely requires the trier of fact "to believe that the existence of a
fact is more probable than its nonexistence. ' '10'
On the opposite end of the spectrum is a criminal trial where the
consequence of error is extremely grave: the constriction of liberty of a
possibly innocent citizen."' Since society has an interest in protecting the
innocent, the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt and is crafted
to prevent, as near as possible, the chance of an erroneous judgment. '°
Furthermore, some courts have extended this standard of proof to non-
criminal situations in which a person's freedom collides with the state's
interest in confinement for the protection of the public. 5
Between these two standards is the clear and convincing evidence
standard. Courts use this standard of proof when a person's interests in a
judicial proceeding are both "particularly important" and "more
substantial than mere loss of money.'' 6 Courts have universally adopted
this standard in cases involving the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical
assistance from incompetent, severely-impaired conservatees. Adoption
of this standard was necessary to most effectively balance the state's
interests in the preservation of life,'O' the prevention of suicide,' " the
98. Lillian F., 206 Cal. Rptr. at 607 and Wendland, 28 P.3d at 169.
99. Lillian F., 206 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Winship, 397 U.S. at 371.
103. Lillian F, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
104. Id.
105. See In re Angelia P., 623 P.2d 198, 203 (Cal.1981). See also
Conservatorship of Roulet, 590 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979).
106. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756.
107. See L.W., 482 N.W.2d at 90. See also Bartling, 209 Cal.Rptr. at 225; Spring,
405 N.E.2d at 119; Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1977); Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 651-52; and Thor, 855 P.2d at
383.
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safeguarding of the medical profession' °9 and the protection of third
parties"' against the conservatee's interest in refusing medical treatment."'
As best explained by the Wendland court:
108. See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1224 ("In any event, declining life-sustaining
medical treatment may not properly be viewed as an attempt to commit suicide.
Refusing medical intervention merely allows the disease to take its natural course;
if death were eventually to occur, it would be the result, primarily, of the
underlying disease, and not the result of a self-inflicted injury."). See also Satz v.
Perimutter, 362 So.2d 160, 162 (Fla. 1978); Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426; Torres,
357 N.W.2d at 339; and Colyer, 660 P.2d at 742. But see Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 296
(Scalia, J., concurring). J. Scalia continued:
Suicide, it is said, consists of an affirmative act to end one's life; refusing
treatment is not an affirmative act 'causing' death, but merely a passive
acceptance of the natural process of dying... the cause of death in both
cases is the suicide's conscious decision to 'put an end to his own
existence.'
Id.
109. See Morrison, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 534 ("The prevailing viewpoint among
medical ethicists appears to be that a physician has the right to refuse on personal
moral grounds to follow a conservator's direction to withhold life-sustaining
treatment, but must be willing to transfer the patient to another physician who will
follow the conservator's direction.") and Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 10. The Cobbs court
explained:
except in rare cases, courts may safely assume the knowledge of patient
and physician are not in parity... the patient has an abject dependence
upon and trust in his physician for the information upon which he relies
during the decisional process, thus raising an obligation in the physician
that transcends arm-length transactions.
Id.
But see Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1224-25. The Conroy court stated:
This interest, like the interest in preventing suicide, is not particularly
threatened by permitting competent patients to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment... If the patient rejected the doctor's advice, the onus
of that decision would rest on the patient, not the doctor. Indeed, if the
patient's right to informed consent is to have any meaning at all, it must
be accorded respect even when it conflicts with the advice of the doctor or
the values of the medical profession as a whole.
Id.
See also Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960) ("A doctor might well
believe that an operation of form of treatment is desirable or necessary, but the
law does not permit him to substitute his own judgment for that of the patient by
any form of artifice or deception."); Thor, 855 P.2d at 382 ("[W]e conclude as a
general proposition that a physician has no duty to treat an individual who declines
medical intervention after 'reasonable disclosure of the available choices with
2002]
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While it may be constitutionally permissible to assume that an
agent freely designated by a formerly competent person to make
all health care decisions, including life-ending ones, will resolve
such questions "in accordance with the principal's ... wishes, one
cannot apply the same assumption to conservators and
conservatees. For this reason, when the legal premise of a
conservator's decision to end a conservatee's life by withholding
medical care is that the conservatee would refuse such care, to
apply a high standard of proof will help to ensure the reliability
of the decision.'
1 2
Therefore, whenever a conservator asserts that a
conservatee had made a statement, or series of statements, prior
to her tragic accident that she would not desire life-sustaining
medical procedures to be employed if it appeared that there was
no foreseeable hope of her regaining any cognitive or sapient
functions, the courts apply the clear and convincing evidence
standard."
3
respect to proposed therapy [including non-treatment] and of the dangers
inherently and potentially involved in each."'); and L.W., 482 N.W.2d at 63 ("The
existence of this right will prevent premature and rash decisions to allow a patient
to die, and will remove the potential conflict for the medical profession between
ordinary compassion and the Hippocratic Oath.").
110. See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1225 ("When the patient's exercise of his free
choice could adversely and directly affect the health, safety or security of others,
the patient's right of self-determination must frequently give way. Thus, for
example, courts have required competent adults to undergo medical procedures
against their will if necessary to protect the public health.") and Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (recognizing enforceability of compulsory
smallpox vaccination law). See also Bartling, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 226 ("This interest
has been invoked, for example, where the patient attempting to refuse treatment
has minor children who would be left without a parent should the treatment not
proceed.").
111. See, e.g., Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840; Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261; Santosky, 455
U.S. 745; L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60; Lillian F., 206 Cal. Rptr. 603; and Wendland, 28
P.3d 151.
112. Wendland, 28 P.3d at 433.
113. Cf Splaine, supra note 19, at 939. Splaine explained:
A heightened burden of proof such as requiring clear and convincing
evidence, however, may preclude effectuation of patients' rights and
wishes. Courts have almost invariably rejected formerly competent
patient's prior statements to family members and friends under the clear
and convincing evidence standard... courts are imposing a burden that is
virtually impossible to overcome. This burden is entirely unnecessary
since less restrictive procedural safeguards adequately protect against
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B. Applied Tests
Due to the complexity of this area of law, courts have struggled to
devise a particular test that satisfies the competing interests of the state
and the conservatee. Of course, different states have different
perspectives of which rights are superior. As a direct result, many
different tests exist.
1. Good Faith Basis Test
The first and perhaps simplest test is known as either the Good Faith
Basis Test,"4 the Best Interests Standard"5 or the Substituted Judgment
Doctrine. ' 6 Under this test, the conservator need only demonstrate that
all medical decisions concerning the fate of the incompetent are being
made on a good faith basis and with the conservatee's best interests in
mind. "'7 In essence, the conservator is substituting his judgment for the
conservatee's.
In making any decision under this test, courts have presented a twelve-
factor test as a helpful guide for the conservator.' Following the factors,
abuse. A heightened burden of proof also disregards the patient's family
members' unique decision making position. Because of a family's close
association with incompetent patients, they may understandably 'just
know' what a patient's preferences would be, despite the likelihood that
such intuitiveness is not provable in court. A heightened evidentiary
standard, therefore, would not only neutralize the advantages created by
having patients' family members make medical decisions, it would
produce poor legal decision making.
Id.
114. See generally Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840.
115. See L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60.
116. Id. at 77-78.
117. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
118. L.W., 482 N.W.2d at 65-66 (The courts twelve factors are as follows:
1. Whether the ward ever expressed any views regarding life-sustaining
treatment.
2. The wishes of the family.
3. An independent medical opinion.
4. The recommendation, if any, of a bioethics committee.
5. The chances of physical recovery.
6. The chances of mental recovery.
7. The likelihood of physical, psychological or emotional injury as a result
of providing or not providing treatment.
8. The likelihood and duration of survival without treatment.
9. The physical effects of prolonged treatment.
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the conservator should determine that life-sustaining treatment is
unnecessary if it will offer "no reasonable possibility of returning the
conservatee to cognitive life and if it is not otherwise in the conservatee's
best interests." 119
The advantage of this test is its simplicity and expediency. However, in
this advantage lies an inherent and fatal flaw: extreme subjectivity ° and a
lack of checks and balances. It would be quite easy for a conservator to
assert that he is operating under a good faith basis and thereby gain the
support of the conservatee's family, convincing them that death would be
in the conservatee's best interest. 21 Meanwhile, the conservator may have
10. The benefits of continued life with and without treatment.
11. The motives of those supporting withdrawal.
12. Any other factors bearing on the best interests of the ward.).
119. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
120. See Oldershaw, supra note 8, at 504-05 ("The concept of futility may be
quite variable and have different meanings to different people depending on
whose 'quality of life' is in question...Therefore, quality of life and futility depends
greatly on the patient's individual outlook on life and the outlook of a patient's
family.").
121. Generally, the conservator is a member of the conservatee's family. See
Nooning, supra note 16, at 871. Nooning continued:
All nineteen of the jurisdictions have provided by statute a list of persons
who may act as surrogate for an incompetent patient. Those persons
authorized by statute to make a health care decision (if no guardian has
been appointed) generally include the patient's spouse, adult child,
parent, adult sibling, grandparent and/or adult grandchild. Several
jurisdictions additionally provide that either a competent relative of the
patient or the patient's nearest living relative may make the health care
decision.
Id.
However, in these situations where a family member of the conservatee is the
conservator, it is important to heed the warning presented by Splaine, supra note
19, at 934-35. Splaine commented:
Ironically, the very intimacy that makes family members the most logical
surrogate decisionmakers also raises the possibility of abuse and conflicts
of interest. Family members may suffer more pain from patients'
conditions than the patients themselves. Similarly, family members may
derive their own emotional satisfaction from caring for incompetent
patients. Consequently, the concern arises that family members as
surrogates may impose their own self-interests and values when deciding
patients' best interests. For instance, family members may reflect their
own fear of dying or, conversely, their own desire not to remain on life-
sustaining systems. In addition, a conflict of interest may arise where it is
in the family's financial interests to discontinue life-sustaining treatment.
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ulterior undisclosed motives, such as a substantial life insurance policy on
the conservatee.
22
2. Ordinary v. Extraordinary Test
Another test is the "Ordinary v. Extraordinary" or "Benefits v.
Burdens" test.'23 Under this test, medical treatment that is considered to
be ordinary should always be required, while extraordinary medical
treatment is considered optional.' 24 Extraordinary medical treatment is
defined as "all procedures, operations or other interventions which are
excessively expensive, burdensome or inconvenient or which offer no hope
of benefit to a patient." '25 Therefore, anytime the treatment's benefits
outweigh its burdens, the treatment would be characterized as ordinary
and, therefore, ethically required.'26 Otherwise, the treatment would be
considered extraordinary and, therefore, optional. Nevertheless,
consider that
While these are legitimate concerns, the greater likelihood is that patients'
families will have the same interests of the patients and, therefore, will act
on behalf of patients' best interests.
Id.
122. Cf. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 861 (David Drabick, the conservator, had a
$40,000 life insurance policy on the life of his brother, the conservatee, the
proceeds of which he planned to use to send his children to college). The court
further said:
While it is hard to avoid the conclusion that this financial interest is
logically relevant to the conservator's good faith, it does not follow that
this interest would compel the superior court to disapprove the petition
or, more appropriately, to appoint a new conservator. Conservators will
often be chosen from the conservatee's immediate family, since family
members are most likely to appreciate the conservatee's personal values.
Indeed, designated family members are entitled preference... Since
immediate family members are likely to have some testamentary or
beneficial interest, an inflexible rule in this area would often eliminate
those persons most qualified to serve as conservators... a financial interest
need not disqualify a potential conservator in all cases.
Id.
123. See Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491; Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 659; and Conroy,
486 A.2d at 1218.
124. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1234.
125. Id. at 1218.
126. Id. at 1235.
127. Id.
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even if a proposed course of treatment might be extremely
painful or intrusive, it would still be proportionate treatment if
the prognosis was for complete cure or significant improvement
in the patient's condition. On the other hand, a treatment course
which is only minimally painful or intrusive may nonetheless be
considered disproportionate to the potential benefits if the
prognosis is virtually hopeless for any significant improvement in
condition.128
The problematic part of this test is its extremely subjective nature, even
for the medical profession. Considering that the majority of the members
of the medical profession do not agree on such issues as the intrusiveness
of a procedure, its intrinsic risk or the possibility of a favorable result, the
risk of error for a court with no medical background applying this test is
astronomical. Furthermore, the terms 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary' have
assumed too many inconsistent connotations to remain useful.'29
Depending upon which definitions are applied, any particular treatment
for an incompetent conservatee could be considered both ordinary and
extraordinary.30 What should a conservator do in that situation? Should
one err on the side of preservation of life, 3 ' even when the conservatee has
128. Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
129. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1235.
130. Id.
131. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283. The Supreme Court stated:
An erroneous decision not to terminate results in a maintenance of the
status quo; the possibility of subsequent developments such as
advancements in medical science, the discovery of new evidence regarding
the patient's intent, changes in the law or simply the unexpected death of
the patient despite the administration of life-sustaining treatment at least
create the potential that a wrong decision will eventually be corrected or
its impact mitigated. An erroneous decision to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment, however, is not susceptible of correction.
Id.
But see id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting). J. Brennan argued:
An erroneous decision to terminate life support is irrevocable, says the
majority, while an erroneous decision not to terminate 'results in the
maintenance of the status quo.' But, from the point of view of the patient,
an erroneous decision in either direction is irrevocable. An erroneous
decision to terminate artificial nutrition and hydration, to be sure, will
lead to failure of that last remnant of physiological life, the brain stem and
result in complete brain death. An erroneous decision not to terminate
life support, however, robs a patient of the very qualities protected by the
right to avoid unwanted medical treatment. His own degraded existence
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personally expressed that he or she would not desire to live like a
vegetable? 2  The only advantage this test offers is to provide the
conservator with some guidance when making this solemn decision.
3. Subjective Test
A third test is the Subjective Test."3 This extremely popular test has
been employed by many courts.'T " The Subjective Test is summarized best
by the New Jersey Supreme Court, which devised it in the case of In re
Conroy, "[t]he question is not what a reasonable or average person would
have chosen to do under the circumstances but what the particular patient
would have done if able to choose for himself. The patient may have
expressed, in one or more ways, an intent not to have life-sustaining
medical intervention." '5
Of all of the aforementioned tests, the Subjective Test is the most
promising. It provides the conservatee with the greatest role in the
decision-making process. It also allows the conservator and the
conservatee's family to testify as to what medical procedures the
conservatee said she would, or would not, have consented to, and any
decision will be fashioned around the conservatee's pre-accident
statements.
is perpetuated; his family's suffering is protracted; the memory he leaves
behind becomes more and more distorted.
Id.
132. Cf. L.W., 482 N.W.2d at 79. The court held:
Certainly the patient's wishes, as far as they can be discerned, are an
appropriate consideration for the guardian. If the wishes are clear, it is
invariable as a matter of law, both common and statutory, that it is in the
best interests of the patient to have those wishes honored, for the patient
has made the pre-choice of what he or she considers to be the best
interests under the circumstances that arise.
Id.
133. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1229-30.
134. See, e.g., In re Browning, 568 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1990); In re Estate of
Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (1990); Brophy, 497 N.E.2d 626; Storar, 420 N.E.2d
64; and Colyer, 660 P.2d 738.
135. 486 A.2d 1209, 1229-30 (N.J. 1985) (holding that the intent might be
demonstrated by a written document, or a living will, oral directives to a family
member, friend or health care provider, durable powers of attorney, or medical
proxies, reactions the patient in question had to other people regarding their
medical treatment, religious beliefs, or a pattern of conduct with respect to prior
medical decisions).
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The main drawbacks of this test are that courts are required to accept
that the conservator and conservatee's family are telling the truth and are
operating both in good faith and with the conservatee's best interests in
mind. Furthermore, "the probative value of such evidence may vary
depending on the remoteness, consistency and thoughtfulness of the prior
statements or actions, and the maturity of the person at the time of the
statements or acts." '136 For example, a casual statement about wanting to
die under certain circumstances made by a conservatee when youthful,
and in the crest of life, would not in itself represent clear corroboration
twenty years later that the person would want life-sustaining treatment
withheld.
37
The last and most troubling aspect of the Subjective Test would be the
specificity of the conservatee's statements. Any detailed statements by the
conservatee about the level of impaired functioning and the forms of
medical treatment that one would find intolerable must be specific enough
to encompass the conservatee's present situation in order to pass the clear
and convincing evidence standard."" This issue of specificity has presented
the greatest problem for this test in recent case law.3 9
4. Limited Objective Test
The next test, the Limited-Objective Test, is a hybrid of the Subjective
Test and the Ordinary v. Extraordinary Test. Under this model, life-
sustaining medical treatment may be withdrawn from a conservatee if the
conservatee made statements, prior to the accident, that he or she would
refuse life-sustaining treatment. Furthermore, the burdens of the life-
sustaining treatment must outweigh the benefits.140 These statements need
not unequivocally express that the conservatee would refuse medical
treatment in his exact situation but rather must be found to be generally
trustworthy.'14  Under the Limited Objective Test, any statements
considered too vague, casual or remote under the Subjective Test would
likely be adequate.4 2 Lastly, any medical evidence about the conservatee's
future is especially crucial, 143 mainly the conservatee's "life expectancy,
136. Id. at 1230-31.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., id.; Wendland, 28 P.3d 151; Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647; and Cruzan,
497 U.S. 261.
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prognosis, level of functioning, degree of humiliation and dependency and
treatment options."'"
The advantages and disadvantages of this test are readily apparent. It is
extremely subjective, and the potential for abuse by the conservator and
the conservatee's family is still present. Furthermore, the benefits and
burdens of a proposed treatment or forecast of the conservatee's
improvements are nearly impossible to discern with any certainty.
However, this test is flexible and will help the conservator make a calm,
collected and rational decision.
5. Pure Objective Test
The final test is the Pure Objective Test.'45 Under this test, only pre-
accident statements in which the conservatee expressed a desire to live
under the conditions she now finds herself are material.'" Anything to the
contrary would be disregarded.147 This test, like the Limited-Objective
Test, also incorporates the Ordinary v. Extraordinary Test.'"8 Hence, if the
burden of the life-sustaining treatment outweighs the benefits, it should be
withdrawn.
The advantages of the "Pure Objective" Test are that it eradicates the
intrinsic disadvantages of the Subjective Test. The conservator's decision
is based primarily on medical advice. Yet, therein lies the problem. As
already mentioned, in every medical decision, no matter how routine,
there are always underlying hazards that may cause the computation of
risk to be different for each physician. As a result, the fate of the
conservatee is determined by whichever members of the medical
profession the conservator chooses to solicit for advice.
IV. THE FIVE-PRONG MODEL TEST
A. THE JUDICIARY v. THE LEGISLATURE
In forming the appropriate test, the first issue to be addressed is the
determination of which governmental body is best suited to balance the
interests of the state, conservatee and conservator. Should the courts have
any place in the decision-making process when a conservator must make a
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1232-33.
146. Id. at 1232-33.
147. Id. at 1232-33.
148. Id at 1232.
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life-or-death decision regarding an incompetent, severely disabled
conservatee? The majority of courts hold that the judiciary, in the absence
of a disagreement among the conservator, the conservatee's family, the
attending physicians or the hospital ethics committee, should never get
involved. 9 The majority deems a practice of having a conservatee apply
to a court to confirm resolutions of any medical decisions generally
unsuitable, not only because it would be a superfluous intrusion upon the
medical profession's field of competence but also because it would be
impermissibly burdensome.'5 ° Such a review by the judiciary should be
undertaken only in areas where it is really needed. The adjudication and
commitment of mental incompetents are two examples."'
The majority of courts correctly assert that this kind of cumbersome
decision is best served if placed firmly in the hands of the legislature."2 As
an elected group that must respond to concerns voiced by the people, the
legislature is best able to balance the competing values.'53 Furthermore, it
has the resources and capability to synthesize vast quantities of data and
opinions from an array of subjects in order to formulate general guidelines
that may be applicable to an extensive range of circumstances.' 54 Because
of these factors, the legislature is the only body which can "address the
moral, social, ethical, medical and legal issues raised by" issues such as
these.'55 If a test is to be fashioned, it should necessarily flow from the
hands of the legislature.
5 6
149. See generally L. W., 428 N.W.2d at 75; Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 669; Cruzan,
497 U.S. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring); and Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
150. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 669.
151. Id.
152. See generally L.W., 428 N.W.2d at 101; Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1220; Barber,
195 Cal. Rptr. at 488; and Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring).
153. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1220. See also Splaine, supra note 19, at 929-30
("Since abating life-sustaining treatment involves not only questions of law but
also medical and ethical concerns, legislatures, as elected bodies, are better able to
respond to the issue. Legislatures have more time to deliberate these issues fully,
whereas courts must make decisions one at a time on specific facts without the
opportunity of formulating an overall framework for decision making.") and
Nooning, supra note 16, at 875 ("...the legislature is elected by the people to
represent them and therefore, is best suited for determining social policy.").
154. Id.
155. Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr at 488.
156. See generally L.W., 482 N.W.2d at 101; Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1220; Barber,
195 Cal. Rptr. at 488; and Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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B. THE FIVE-PRONG MODEL TEST
The first prong of the quintessential test that the legislature should
develop is a series of medical questions that must be answered by the
conservatee's attending physicians. The questions should be neither
subjective, nor objective, but based on sound medical expertise. They
unavoidably must serve as the first prong because without a definitive
answer the whole process fails, and irreversible error is inevitable. This
series of questions is as follows: Does the current state of medical or
scientific knowledge suggest that a cure for all or part of the conservatee's
disability will be found in the near future? If the cure will only be partial,
will it return the conservatee to a mental or physical state that the
conservatee would find acceptable? Or, in the case the conservatee had
not expressed his wishes should an accident occur, will it return the
conservatee to a mental or physical state that the conservator would find
acceptable? If the answer to these questions is a positive one, the
conservator can conclude that life-sustaining treatment should continue.
If there is any negative answer, then the conservator must proceed to the
analysis of the second prong.
The second prong of the test is modeled after the Subjective Test.'57
Had the conservatee expressed a desire to have life-sustaining treatment
withheld or withdrawn should a debilitating accident leave the person
without the sapient functions of the brain? If the answer to this prong is
negative, then the conservator should skip the third prong of the test and
proceed directly to the fourth. On the other hand, if the answer is
positive, the conservator should continue on to the third prong.
The third prong concerns the time and circumstances of the above
statements. How long ago did the conservatee express these desires? Was
the conservatee under the influence of drugs or alcohol? This is a
subjective determination, but it is not to be made by the conservator.
Rather, this is where judicial intervention would be compulsory. For
example, if the court finds the time frame to be too excessive, then the
conservatee's wishes may be disregarded. Also, if the conservatee was
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, her statement should be
disregarded. Conversely, life-sustaining treatment shall be withheld if the
conservatee was lucid and the time frame was quite recent. The
conservatee's desires should be scrutinized, using the clear and convincing
. 157. See supra notes 137-44 (and accompanying text).
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evidence standard."' This is the only way to balance the preservation of
life and the right of the conservatee to decline medical treatment." 9
The fourth prong is a reasonable person test. It simply asks the
question: Would a reasonable person in the conservatee's position desire
to have life-sustaining treatment withheld?"6  If the conservator, the
conservatee's family, the attending physicians and the hospital's ethics
committee or ombudsman determine that the answer to that question is
positive, then the life-sustaining treatment must be removed. However if
the answer by any of the aforementioned parties is negative, then the
conservatee should remain on life-sustaining treatment. An affirmative
answer to this prong must be unanimous because the risk of error is too
great. A decision to keep the conservatee alive can always be altered at a
later date when more information is gathered.1 6' However, a decision to
terminate all medical procedures and let the conservatee die of natural
causes is, of course, irreversible.' 6
The fifth and most crucial prong of this test is the good faith basis
prong. The conservator must show that she or he is acting in good faith. 63
The potential for abuse is far too great, and the conservator should not be
158. See supra notes 110-17 (and accompanying text).
159. Cf. Wendland, 28 P 3d. at 165-66 (When dealing with a conservatee's life, it
may be considered unconstitutional to have any standard lower than by clear and
convincing evidence.).
160. See Oldershaw, supra note 8, at 507-08. Oldershaw stated:
A growing body of literature indicates the symptoms of death by
starvation are not severe. Following cessation of fluid intake,
hpernatremia [excess salt condition] develops slowly and induces
confusion, weakness and lethargy which eventually progresses to impaired
consciousness. The patient slowly progresses into unconsciousness over a
period of days without complaining of pain or discomfort. In otherwise
alert cancer patients, final hours of life are often marked by a sense of
well-being following cessation of fluid therapy. One recurring physical
complaint related to the absence or oral fluid intake is a dry mouth. This
minimal discomfort can be alleviated by attending to oral hygiene such as
providing ice chips, moistening cloths, and mildly irrigating. Total
starvation is ironically associated with euphoria, in contrast to semi-
starvation which produces intestine discomfort and depression. Rather
than of [sic] inducing pain, food deprivation typically causes hypalgesia
and/or analgesia.
Id.
161. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283.
162. Id.
163. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
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allowed to make a decision based upon his or her subjective view of the
conservatee's personal worth.'6' However, unlike the third prong, the
judiciary is not the appropriate body to safeguard the conservatee's
interests. As an alternative, the hospital's ethics committee would be the
most appropriate body to supervise the conservator's decision.'6 1 Since it
is ultimately the party with the greatest power and the last cog in the
decision-making process, it is able to determine if there are any external
pressures or influences that might be tainting the conservator's decision.
CONCLUSION
Whenever a person suffers, it is a heart-wrenching, emotionally-
draining time for all who love that person. This difficulty is compounded
even further when a loved one is brutally injured in an unfortunate
accident and enters a vegetative state. Though the person is still physically
present, a significant part of that person has left forever and will never
return. One must necessarily postulate whether that person is already in
Heaven or is stuck in a dark, lonely cell to which only the conservator has
the key.
The decisions that must be made in such a disastrous sequence of events
are excessively burdensome and furnish no easy answers. Many tests have
been formed and burdens of proof established to help the family members
faced with these difficult decisions. They vary in complexity and have
inherent advantages and disadvantages. The five-prong model test
discussed in this Comment is designed to flush out these obscurities.
Though it is neither intended to make this process any less distressing nor
contains all the answers, it provides the least intrusive and most effective
means to do what is best for the conservatee, and that is the ultimate
concern.
164. L.W., 482 N.W.2d at 73 (quoting Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 689 n. 23)("We
emphasize at this point that the guardian must assess these factors from the
standpoint of the patient and should not substitute his or her own view of the
'quality of life' of the ward.").
165. See generally Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 668-69.
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